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Abstract
Objective—In 2012 in New Jersey, a train derailment resulted in the puncture of a tanker car 
carrying liquid vinyl chloride under pressure, and a resulting airborne vinyl chloride plume drifted 
onto the grounds of a nearby refinery. This report details the investigation of exposures and 
symptoms among refinery workers.
Design and setting—The investigation team met with refinery workers to discuss their 
experience after the derailment and provided workers a self-administered survey to document 
symptoms and worker responses during the incident. Associations among categorical variables 
and experiencing symptoms were evaluated using Fisher’s exact test.
Participants—Twenty-six of 155 (17 percent) workers present at the refinery or driving on the 
access road the date the spill occurred completed the survey.
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Main outcome measure(s)—Any self-reported symptom following exposure from the vinyl 
chloride release.
Results—Fifteen workers (58 percent) reported ≥1 symptom, most commonly headache (12, 46 
percent). Three (12 percent) reported using respiratory protection. No differences in reporting 
symptoms were observed by location during the incident or by the building in which workers 
sheltered. Workers who moved from one shelter to another during the incident (ie, broke shelter) 
were more likely to report symptoms (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.03); however, there are only 
limited data regarding vinyl chloride concentrations in shelters versus outside.
Conclusions—Breaking shelter might result in greater exposures and managers and health and 
safety officers of vulnerable facilities with limited physical access should consider developing 
robust shelter-in-place plans and alternate emergency egress plans. Workers should consider using 
respiratory protection if exiting a shelter is necessary during a chemical incident.
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Introduction
At 6:59 AM on November 30, 2012, seven freight train tanker cars derailed when a bridge in a 
borough in New Jersey failed. One tanker car carrying liquid vinyl chloride under pressure 
was breached, releasing approximately 20,000 gallons of vinyl chloride as a vapor, mist, and 
liquid.1,2 At approximately 7:15 AM, local police began advising residents door-to-door 
within 0.5 mile from the site to evacuate or shelter in place (SIP).1,2 By 5:00 PM, evacuation 
orders were issued to include approximately 550 borough residents, and over the next 3 
days, SIP were issued and lifted as airborne vinyl chloride concentrations fluctuated; on 
December 4, evacuation orders were issued to an additional 300–400 borough residents.2
Vinyl chloride is the product of chlorination of ethylene and is used in the production of 
polyvinyl chloride. Vinyl chloride is a colorless gas denser than air with a characteristic 
sweet odor3,4 that is transported liquefied and under pressure. The US Environmental 
Protection Agency (USEPA) estimated a median annual ambient vinyl chloride 
concentration of 3.34 × 10−3 µg/m3 (0.001 parts per million [ppm]) for the state of New 
Jersey in 1996.5
Acute health effects of vinyl chloride exposure include headache, difficulty in breathing, 
dizziness, drowsiness, and at extremely high concentrations, loss of consciousness and 
death.1 Airborne acute exposure guideline levels (AEGLs) established for the National 
Research Council and the USEPA are as follows: AEGL-1 (reversible, nondisabling), 1 hour 
at 250 ppm-4 hours at 140 ppm; AEGL-2 (potentially irreversible, impairing ability to 
escape), 1 hour at 1,200 ppm-4 hours at 820 ppm; and AEGL-3 (potentially lethal), 1 hour at 
4,800 ppm-4 hours at 3,400 ppm.4 The odor threshold for vinyl chloride is dependent on the 
individual with a reported range from 10 to 3,000 ppin,3,4 thus making odor an inadequate 
warning indicator.
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In response to a request from the New Jersey Department of Health (NJDOH), the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 
Registry (ATSDR) assembled an assessment of chemical exposures (ACE) team, consisting 
of epidemiologists, toxicologists, and environmental health scientists to investigate health 
statuses after the vinyl chloride release among emergency responders6 and residents 
(manuscript in preparation). Seventeen days after the derailment, the investigation team was 
contacted by an employee representative of an asphalt refinery located approximately 0.5 
mile from the derailment site, who was concerned about workers’ chemical exposures. The 
next day, the investigation team held meetings with refinery workers, the health and safety 
officer, and the environmental officer to discuss the workers’ experiences and health 
concerns. This report describes the investigation of vinyl chloride exposures and symptoms 
experienced among workers at the refinery.
Methods
CDC/ATSDR and the NJDOH determined that this investigation was public health practice 
(ie, non-research).
Meeting with refinery workers and survey design and administration
A subset of the investigation team interviewed the refinery safety officer and environmental 
officer, and met with approximately 20 workers (recruited by word-of-mouth) the day after 
the team was first approached by a refinery worker representative. Workers shared their 
experiences the day of the derailment and concerns about possible health effects associated 
with vinyl chloride exposure. These meetings informed the design of a cross-sectional 
voluntary survey of all refinery workers (including contractors) using a questionnaire 
adapted from the ATSDR ACE toolkit (http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/ntsip/ace_toolkit.html). 
The questionnaire included questions detailing where they were during the incident, what 
they observed, where, if anywhere, they sheltered, and about any symptoms experienced and 
healthcare received following the vinyl chloride release (see Appendix 1). Three days after 
the investigation team visited the refinery, survey copies and return envelopes were provided 
to the refinery’s health and safety officer, environmental officer, and employee 
representative for distribution to all workers the next week; during the next 3 weeks, the 
health and safety officer and environmental officer provided follow-up reminders. 
Participants had the option of mailing their survey to NJDOH or providing it to the refinery 
health and safety officer for batch-mailing to NJDOH. NJDOH completed survey data entry 
and provided the data to CDC/ATSDR investigators with identifiers removed. The findings 
of the investigation were provided to the refinery environmental officer.
Data analysis
Symptoms were grouped according to clinical presentation, including dizziness, weakness, 
and loss of balance (neurologic); runny nose, burning sensation in the nose or throat, and 
hoarseness (upper respiratory); and shortness of breath, chest tightness, wheezing, and 
burning sensation in the lungs (lower respiratory).6 Coughing and increased congestion or 
increased phlegm were included separately because their cause might be upper or lower 
respiratory in nature. Associations among self-reported worker characteristics or activities 
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and experiencing any symptoms were assessed by either Fisher’s exact test for dichotomous 
exposure categories or Cochrane-Armitage trend test for ordinal exposure categories, with p 
< 0.05 considered statistically significant. Statistical analyses were performed using SAS® 
9.3 (SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC).
Results
The refinery is located on a peninsula accessible by only one road, which is crossed by the 
railroad tracks. The bridge failure occurred immediately before shift change, and 
approximately 0.5 mile from the railroad crossing, resulting in the access road being 
blocked. Consequently, 155 workers were unable to leave the refinery or were blocked on 
the access road and unable to enter the refinery.
Refinery personnel used handheld photoionization detectors (PIDs; Industrial Scientific 
MX6) calibrated with isobutylene (which can be used to estimate vinyl chloride 
concentrations by multiplying the measured concentration by 1.9) and identified elevated 
levels of an unknown volatile organic compound (VOC) out-doors within the refinery 
property ≤40 minutes after the derailment. Workers reported witnessing a vapor cloud that 
rose above the railcars and spread to the refinery and access road. An hour after the 
derailment, the refinery environmental officer learned from the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection that a SIP order had been given for nearby residents, and from 
local emergency response radio that the vapor cloud was moving toward the refinery. 
Refinery management communicated by refinery intercom, loudspeakers, and radio an order 
to SIP in the nearest building for all workers and activated the incident command. Workers 
sheltered in 10 refinery property buildings.
Approximately 30 minutes after the train derailed, law enforcement officers began telling 
workers on the access road to leave the area and, within 2 hours after the derailment, the 
traffic backup on the access road had dispersed. The train was cleared from the road 
approximately 4 hours after the derailment, and all nonessential workers were released from 
the refinery.
During the incident, field portable and stationary PID VOC readings at multiple refinery 
locations rose from 0 to >200 ppm. Therefore, vinyl chloride concentrations on the refinery 
grounds that exceeded the 1-hour AEGL-1 after the derailment were likely. The refinery 
health and safety officer and environmental officer both reported difficulty in obtaining 
information from the incident command at the derailment site and the subsequent incident 
unified command.
Exposure and symptom survey
Thirty workers completed the survey; of these 30, four reported not working the day of the 
incident and were excluded from further analysis. Characteristics of the 26 workers are 
provided (Table 1). Twenty (77 percent) were men; 14 (54 percent) were refinery 
employees, and 12 (46 percent) were contractors. Fourteen (54 percent) reported having 
received hazardous material (HAZMAT) training; 5 (of 25, 20 percent) reported firefighting 
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training; and 5 (of 24, 19 percent) reported being a member of the refinery’s incident 
command.
Eighteen workers (69 percent) reported being at the refinery during the incident and 
sheltering-in-place, and 8 (31 percent) reported being blocked on the access road; of the 
eight workers blocked on the access road, two reported first learning about the derailment 
and vinyl chloride release from a coworker or supervisor. Ten workers at the refinery (56 
percent) reported moving from one shelter to another (ie, breaking shelter) during the 
incident at the direction of supervisors or refinery emergency communications, either in 
response to rising VOC measurements or to congregate at other predetermined shelters. 
Three workers at the refinery (17 percent) reported wearing a respirator at some point during 
the incident. Although not specifically asked in the questionnaire, one respondent noted that 
concentrations were, at one point, higher in their shelter than outside.
Fifteen of 26 (58 percent) reported experiencing ≥1 symptom (Table 2), most commonly 
headache, which was also the most common symptom reported by first responders.6 None 
reported seeking medical care following the incident. Seventeen (65 percent) reported an 
unusual odor or taste after the incident, 10 (59 percent) of whom described it as sweet; an 
unusual or a sweet odor or taste was not associated with experiencing symptoms.
One worker’s duties included searching the grounds for other workers and escorting them to 
shelter; this worker reported wearing a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and was 
excluded from the following analyses. Workers at the refinery who reported breaking shelter 
were more likely to report having a symptom (9/10 vs 2/7; Fisher’s exact p = 0.03). 
Furthermore, 5/6 (83 percent) who broke shelter one time (ie, sheltered in two locations) 
reported symptoms, and 4/4 (100 percent) who broke shelter two times (ie, sheltered in three 
locations) reported symptoms (Cochrane-Armitage exact p = 0.02). Sex, employer, having 
received firefighter or FIAZMAT training, being part of the incident command, location at 
time of incident (at refinery vs on access road), and the building where the worker sheltered 
were not associated with reporting symptoms.
Workers also expressed multiple concerns in qualitative responses, including lack of 
communication with outside agencies after the derailment (n = 5); emergency responders not 
being able to reach the refinery if the entrance was blocked by a train (n = 3); and workers 
sheltering in locations with detectable, elevated VOCs (n = 3). One noted that no SCBAs 
were located in their shelter, and one noted that the incident might have been worse if the 
released chemical had been chlorine or hydrogen fluoride.
Discussion
Evacuating and sheltering-in-place are protective actions against chemical releases.7 
Evacuating is less expedient and can result in higher acute exposures but can be the better 
response when prolonged exposure is likely. Sheltering-in-place involves staying indoors, 
protected from a hazardous airborne chemical outside. Even in leaky buildings, limited air 
exchange can greatly reduce exposures during an outdoor chemical incident, provided the 
air-handling system is shutdown; we do not know whether air-handlers in the refinery 
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buildings designated as shelters were shut down in response to this incident. However, 
continuing to SIP after a chemical plume has passed might result in additional exposure 
because the indoor chemical concentrations might equilibrate with high levels in outside air. 
Comparisons between the two options are limited; however, Kinra et al.8 reported greater 
odds of experiencing symptoms among evacuees versus persons who sheltered-in-place after 
a chemical fire at a plastics factory.
In the incident described in this report, refinery workers were unable to evacuate the facility, 
but some broke shelter and might have been acutely exposed. Although sheltering in any 
given building or set of buildings was not associated with reporting symptoms, those 
workers who broke shelter by moving from one building to another were more likely to 
report symptoms. However, those workers might have broken shelter after observing rising 
VOC concentrations in their shelter; this possibility cannot be addressed because of the 
limited sample size and lack of monitoring data, but one worker indicated that at one point 
during the incident, VOC concentrations were greater inside the shelter than outside.
This analysis has certain limitations, including a relatively low participation rate (26 of 155) 
and possible selection bias for workers who were more likely to have experienced 
symptoms. The lack of association between noting an unusual odor and experiencing a 
symptom might reflect the broad odor threshold for vinyl chloride and underscores its 
inadequate odor-warning properties. We have only limited access to documented VOC 
measurements at the time of the incident and given the size of the refinery and nature of the 
incident (a chemical plume crossing a facility with multiple buildings), we cannot estimate 
vinyl chloride concentrations in shelters versus outside. The limited sample size of this 
analysis also limits its statistical power and prevents concluding that proximity to the 
incident or sheltering-in-place in any given location was associated with symptoms. We did 
not gather information on symptom duration or intensity; however, none of the workers 
reported seeking a medical evaluation for their symptoms. The survey was made available to 
refinery workers 21 days after the incident, which might have limited the potential for recall 
bias.
Conclusions
Although SIP is considered an effective method for reducing acute chemical exposures, 
transit from one shelter to another might not be advisable because workers can be exposed to 
high-contaminant concentrations; opening the doors at the new shelter can allow intrusion of 
the chemical(s), thereby increasing indoor concentrations and increasing exposure of those 
already in the shelter; and workers can be exposed to secondary contamination because of 
off-gassing from clothing or gear. Although this refinery activated an emergency response 
for chemical exposures including an SIP order, workers were still exposed to vinyl chloride 
and experienced symptoms. Development and refinement of robust SIP protocols for 
vulnerable facilities (such as this physically isolated refinery) to protect against chemical 
exposures could include several aspects. Being able to monitor contaminant concentrations 
both inside and outside helps inform decisions to break shelter or discontinue the SIP order. 
Buildings that are designated as shelters need the ability to control outdoor air exchange; 
they should have a quick and well-understood protocol for shutdown of the air-handling 
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system to reduce the potential for chemical intrusion indoors. And after a chemical plume 
has passed, air-handlers need to be able to be restarted quickly to flush intruded chemicals. 
In the case that exiting a shelter during a chemical incident becomes necessary, workers can 
use respiratory protection (eg, SCBA) to reduce acute exposures. SIP protocols should also 
include a communication strategy (eg, text messaging or phone call) to warn offsite workers 
of a chemical incident. Managers and safety officers of facilities with limited physical 
access and the possibility of toxic exposures should consider alternate emergency egress 
plans and ensure that their facilities be integrated into local emergency response plans and 
drills.
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Table 1
Characteristics of workers who completed the survey*








Firefighter (n = 25)‡ 5 20
Hazardous materials 14 54
Incident command member 5 19
Experience during incident
At refinery 18 69
Unable to reach refinery because of blocked access road 8 31
Symptoms experienced†
Headache 12 46
Upper respiratory symptoms 8 31
Neurological 8 31
Lower respiratory symptoms 7 27
Coughing 6 23
Irritation, pain, or burning sensation of eyes 6 23
Nausea or vomiting 5 19
Increased congestion or phlegm 3 12
Any symptom 15 58
Noticed unusual odor or taste 17 65
Sweet odor or taste (n = 17) 10 59
*
n = 26, unless otherwise noted.
†
Multiple answers allowed; totals may be greater than 100 percent.
‡
One worker did not answer this question.
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Table 2
Characteristics of workers who were at the refinery during the incident*
Worker characteristic No. Percent
Experienced ≥1 symptom 11 65
Sheltered in one location at refinery 7 41
Experienced ≥1 symptom (n = 7) 2 29
Sheltered in two locations at refinery 6 35
Experienced ≥1 symptom (n = 6) 5 83
Sheltered in three locations at refinery 4 24
Experienced ≥1 symptom (n = 4) 4 100
Used a respirator at any time during incident 2 12
*
n = 17 (one worker who wore a self-contained breathing apparatus and searched the refinery grounds for nonsheltering workers is excluded from 
this analysis).
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